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WATCHING THE PROTECTORS: INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT
OF MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES
ANNETTE GORDON-REED*
I. INTRODUCTION

The famous statement that the degree of a nation's civilization can be
determined by looking at its prisons conveys the message that the
responsible exercise of state power is an essential ingredient to the
formation and maintenance of a good and enlightened society.'
The
irresponsible use of such power undermines public confidence in the
workings of the government and the laws under which we live. Police
officers, who apprehend criminal suspects, and correction officers, who
incarcerate them, play an extremely important role in the furtherance of

state power. Their ability to restrict the liberty and, in some instances,
take the lives of their fellow citizens lifts them above the rung of ordinary
government officials. For these reasons, more than any other public
servants, they must be seen as worthy of this grant of power. Outside

scrutiny of their actions would seem, therefore, especially appropriate. 2
In July of 1992, in the wake of revelations of widespread police
misconduct, the Mayor of the city of New York, David N. Dinkins, issued
an Executive Order creating a commission to investigate both alleged

police corruption and the internal anti-corruption procedures of the New
York City Police Department.' After almost two years of investigating the
"nature, extent, and causes of police corruption" 4 the commission, headed
* Associate Professor of Law, New York Law School, former counsel to New York
City Board of Correction.
1. FYODOR DOSTYOEVSKI, THE HOUSE OF THE DEAD 76 (C. Garnett trans. 1957).
2. See, e.g., Don't Veto the Police Commission, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1994, at
A18 (discussing the clear need for an independent oversight agency to monitor police
corruption); Sydney H. Schanberg, Police Need Help Policing Themselves, N.Y.
NEVSDAY, May 5, 1995, at A35 (stating that the job of rooting out corrupt police
officers should not be left to "paranoid and insular police culture," but to an independent
oversightagency); see also Police Corruption-Again, N.Y. TIMEs, May 5, 1995, at A30
(stating that recent efforts to uncover police corruption illustrate the value of an
independent oversight agency). But see Thomas D. Thacher II, How to Police the
Police, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1994, at A15 (stating that an outside oversight agency
cannot impose meaningful reforms).
3. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 42 (July 24, 1992).
4. COMM'NTO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUlrPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROC. OF THE POLICE DEP'T, COMM'N REP. 1 (July 7, 1994) (Milton
Mollen, Chair) [hereinafter MOLLEN COMM'N REP.].
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by former Deputy Mayor for Public Service and Appellate Division judge,

Milton Mollen came to the conclusion that the best way to insure
heightened standards of conduct within the Police Department was to
provide independent oversight of its activities.' Accordingly, the Mollen
Commission recommended the creation of a "permanent external Police
Commission [that would be] independent of the Department." 6

The Mollen Commission's call for the creation of an independent

"watchdog" agency, though widely hailed in the press,7 was viewed
skeptically by the administration of Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, who had
taken office during the pendency of the investigation.' The Mayor voiced
support for the concept of outside scrutiny, but disapproved of the

oversight agency as proposed by the Mollen Commission. 9 The District

Attorneys of New York City's five boroughs were more wary of the
concept of outside monitoring, fearing that it would interfere with their
own investigative efforts in certain cases."0
Despite these criticisms, the New York City Council, lead by Speaker
Peter F. Vallone, voted to create an agency along the lines of that
5. Id. at 152.
6. Id.
7. See, e.g., Break the Police CorruptionCycle, N.Y. TIMEs, July 8, 1994, at A26
(stating that "the smart thing to do is seize the [Mollen C]ommission's report as the
opportunity to break the cycle of ... corruption that has dogged the N.Y.P.D. for a
century"); Don't Veto the Police Commission, supra note 2; Schanberg, supra note 2;
Viewpoints, N.Y. NEWSDAY, July 8, 1994, at A34 (stating that the "Mollen Commission
has sounded the alarm and offered solid advice").
8. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hicks, Council Creates an Agency to Watch New York
Police, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 24, 1994, at At (discussing Mayor Giuliani's concern that the
agency would interfere with his management powers and the district attorneys'
investigative powers); Sydney H. Schanberg, Knives Are Outfor Cop Watchdog, N.Y.
NEwsDAY, Dec. 13, 1994, Viewpoints, at A35 (discussing various City authorities' views
of such an oversight body as threatening).
9. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hicks, Mayor Vetoes Bill Creating a Panel to Monitor
Police, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 24, 1994, at Al, A28 (stating that the Mayor feared an
independent "watchdog" agency would infringe on his executive powers and interfere
with other agencies' efforts to investigate and prosecute police corruption); Alison
Mitchell, GiulianiPromisesFight To Root Out Police Corruption,N.Y. TIMEs, July 8,
1994, at Al, B2 (stating that Mayor Giuliani, rather than endorsing the concept of an
independent investigation panel as recommended by the Mollen Commission, favored to
re-create the Office of Special State Prosecutor, or delegate oversight of the Police
Department to the Department of Investigation, an executive office).
10. See Jonathan P. Hicks, N.Y Gets Tough on Police Corruption,S.F. CHRON.,
Nov. 25, 1994, at A14; Leonard Levitt, PoliceActions Speak Volumes, N.Y. NEWSDAY,
Oct. 17, 1994, at A20.
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suggested by the Mollen Commission Report," touching off a battle
between the City's executive and legislative branches.12 The center of
the controversy focused on the City Council's proposal to allocate
appointment powers to the monitoring agency along with a broad grant of
investigatory powers. 3 Under the proposal, the monitoring agency
would be comprised of five members; two appointed by the City Council,
two by the Mayor, and one appointed jointly by the City Council Speaker
and the Mayor. 4 Further, the monitoring agency would be empowered
to "undertake independent investigations of possible corruption within the
Police Department." 15
The Mayor vetoed the City Council's version of the oversight
commission because he believed that the provisions with regard to
appointments and investigations infringed upon executive powers vested
solely in the Mayor's office. 6 Subsequently, the Mayor created his own
commission,17 one with substantially fewer powers and less independence
than the one suggested in the Mollen Commission Report and supported
by the City Council."8 The City Council ruled to override the Mayor's
veto and enacted Local Law 13, putting into effect the Council's version
of the independent police monitor. 9
In June, 1995, a New York state supreme court justice held that the
City Council's proposal violated the New York City Charter.'
The
court agreed with the Mayor's argument that Local Law 13 impermissibly
transferred executive power to the legislative branch, and therefore
11. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 (Jan. 19, 1995).
12. See, e.g., Daniel Wise, City Council's Boardon Police Invalidated, N.Y. L.J.,
June 29, 1995, at 1 (describing the events surrounding the two proposed police
monitoring agencies and describing the legal battle between the Mayor and the City
Council, in which the Mayor has, for the time being, proved victorious).
13. See Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 1995 WL
478872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1995), appealdocketed, No. 95-3710 (1st Dep't N.Y.
App. Div. Nov. 16, 1995).
14. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 §§ 1, 450 (Jan. 19, 1995).
15. See id.
16. See Hicks, supra note 9.
17. See N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18 (Feb. 28, 1995).
18. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
19. See N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 (Jan. 19, 1995).
20. See Mayor ofNew York, 1995 WL 478872 (invalidating the independent agency
created by the City Council because it usurped the Mayor's powers without approval by
means of a public referendum).
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In the wake of this

opinion, the City Council and the Mayor are involved in negotiations
aimed at amending the Council's proposal to address the parties'
Barring success of these negotiations, the City
respective concerns.'
Council has vowed to pursue its appeal of the supreme court's decision.
Whether the lower court's decision is overturned upon appeal,' the
question as to the proper structure and function of an oversight agency for
the police department remains. The supreme court decision did not

address the desirability of having an independent police monitor, nor did
it express any opinion as to the effectiveness of the proposed method of
appointment or broad grant of investigatory powers to the agency.25
Moreover, even if Local Law 13 were to be found invalid by a higher
court, the City Council's proposal might still be implemented through

passage of a public referendum.'

Therefore, it is useful to consider the

benefits and drawbacks inherent in the process of outside monitoring and
the relative merits of the Mayor's and the City Council's approaches to the

issue.
Little noted in the dispute over the creation of a "watchdog" for the
Police Department is the fact that something of a prototype of the
commission suggested by the Mollen Report already exists in New York
City: the New York City Board of Correction (hereinafter BOC), the

oversight agency charged with monitoring the operations of the New York
City Department of Correction. This article discusses that prototype, and
suggests that the history and operations of the BOC may provide some
21. Although the concept of separation of powers does not have the same meaning
in the context of local governments, the basic idea is the same. See Under 21, Catholic
Home Bureau for Dependent Children v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y.
1985) (noting that the New York Court of Appeals has consistently recognized that the
principle of separation of powers is included by implication in the pattern of government
adopted by the State of New York); Subcontractors Trade Assn. v. Koch, 465 N.E.2d
840, 845 (N.Y. 1984) (reaffirming the vitality of the principle of separation of powers
in New York State government).
22. Telephone Interview with Richard Weinberg, Chief Counsel of the New York
City Council (Oct. 11, 1995).
23. Id.; see Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 95-3710 (1st
Dep't N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 16, 1995) (notice of appeal).
24. It is beyond the scope of this article to fully analyze the New York City Charter
and the arguments that led the New York state supreme court to invalidate the City
Council's proposed monitoring agency.
25. See Mayor of New York, 1995 WL 478872.
26. See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW art. 3, § 23(2) (McKinney 1994) ("a local
law shall be subject to mandatory referendum if it ... [a]bolishes, transfers or curtails
any power of an executive officer.").
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guidance in the debate over how best to monitor the operations of the
Police Department. There are, of course, obvious differences between the
BOC's monitoring of the Correction Department and the proposed
monitoring of the Police Department. The most important to be noted is
the far more extensive range of oversight provided by the BOC than is
contemplated for the independent monitor of the Police Department's anticorruption measuresY However, there are some basic features of the
process of oversight that apply to the BOC and would apply to whichever
version of the independent monitoring agency for the Police Department
ultimately prevails.
It is my hope that by describing some of the strengths and weaknesses
of the BOC's operations, as well as some of its experiences in providing
oversight, some light might be shed on what may and may not be
accomplished by the oversight of some of the activities of the New York
City Police Department. Part II of this article discusses the history,
structure, and operations of the Board of Correction. Part Ii discusses
the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of outside oversight of the
activities of law enforcement agencies. Part IV compares the oversight
function with regard to the New York City Department of Correction and
the forms suggested by the City Council and the Mayor for the
commission that would oversee the Police Department's anti-corruption
measures.

II. OvERsiGHT OF THE NEW YORK CITY
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION

A. The New York City Board of Correction-Origins
A progressive force in so many other areas of social policy, New
York City was in the forefront of recognizing the need to provide outside
oversight of the agency devoted to incarceration of those who have
committed crimes and those suspected of having done so. As was the case
in 1992 when concern about problems within the Police Department led
to the creation of a commission and a proposed oversight agency, in 1957,
27. While the independent agency proposed by the Mollen Commission would have
broad investigative and subpoena powers, the BOC has still greater overall monitoring
capabilities because it has the ability to "promulgate... minimum standards in rules and
regulations after giving the mayor and commissioner [of correction] an opportunity to
review and comment on the proposed standards .. " N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 25, §
626(4)(e). The agency proposed by the Mollen Commission, however, would act only
as a watchdog to the Police Department's own anti-corruption efforts. Primary
responsibility for combating police corruption would, thus, still remain within the Police
Department. MOLLEN COMM'N REP. 152-58.
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Mayor Robert Wagner convened a special mayoral panel "to study the
operations of the New York City Department of Correction."'
After reviewing the panel's findings, Mayor Wagner and Anna M.
Kross, the Commissioner of the Department of Correction, concluded that
some of the problems discovered during the investigation of the
Department were the result of too little outside supervision of 1he activities
of correction officers. Both Wagner and Kross thought this problem could
be ameliorated, to a great extent, by the creation of a citizens' watchdog
agency-the BOC-that would serve as the "eyes" of the public.29 The
BOC would consist of nine individuals who would receive no salary and
would serve for fixed terms." In the years immediately following its
creation, the BOC's duties consisted of carrying out its relatively
undefined mandate under the New York City Charter to evaluate the
Department's performance and to report to City officials and the public on
matters involving the City's correctional institutions. 31 That conception
of the BOC's duties remained unchanged until the 1970s when, as the
result of changes in the laws with respect to prisoners, and the tragic and
well-publicized Attica prison riot, the BOC's powers were expanded.
1. The Development of Prisoners' Rights and the Attica Prison Revolt.
In the years between the BOC's inception and the 1970s, the legal
response to inmate' complaints about their treatment while incarcerated
underwent a sea change. The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe v.
Pape,33 which gave citizens the right to seek redress in federal courts
for violation of their constitutional rights,' paved the way for civil rights
suits by inmates. 35 As inmates are, perhaps more than any other class
28. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, ANN. REP. 10 (1991) (reviewing the
history of the BOC).
29. Id.
30. N.Y. CrIY CHARTER ch. 25, § 626 (1976 & Supp. 1983-84).
31. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD. OF CORRECTION, ANN. REP. (1975-1976) 1-2; see
also, This Board Needs Correcting, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 1987, at A26 (describing the
BOC's original purpose as being to "shine a spotlight" on New York's jail system).
32. The term "inmate" will be used throughout this article to cover individuals held
as pre-trial detainees and those convicted of crimes.
33. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (granting a federal cause of action to those whose
constitutional rights have been violated by anyone acting under "color of" state law).
34. Id. at 171.
35. See Jonathan A. Wifllens, Structure, Content and the Exigencies of War:
American PrisonLaw After Twenty-Five Years 1962-1987, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 41, 44
(1987) (stating that the decision in Monroe was immediately interpreted as opening the
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of individuals, under the most direct power of state officials,36 there are
numerous opportunities for them to complain of violations of their
constitutional rights.'
Accordingly, the number of lawsuits filed by
prisoners increased dramatically. 38 The stories told in some of those

lawsuits, brought by individuals and through the mechanism of the class
action, opened the doors to correction institutions and brought the outside
world inside. For the first time, it was possible to see the inner workings
of America's jails and prisons in great detail. This increased scrutiny
revealed serious deficiencies in many of these institutions, and the concept
of "prisoners' rights"-a notion that would have been unfathomable before
the 1960s-gained currency.39
During this time, inmates in New York City jails contributed to the

evolution of attitudes about prisoners' rights by pressing claims that
conditions in the City's jails amounted to deprivations of their
constitutional rights. In Rhem v. Malcolm,n' inmates housed at the
Manhattan House of Detention for Men sought a preliminary injunction to

prevent the continuance of practices by jail officials which, they argued,
were violations of their rights under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.41 The plaintiffs and the City reached an
agreement in the form of a Consent Decree that put various aspects of the

City's jails under the watchful eye of Federal Judge Morris Lasker.42

courts to prisoners claiming violations of their constitutional rights).
36. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475,492 (1973) (noting the extreme control
the state has over prisoners).
37. See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (holding that prisoners must be
provided with adequate law libraries or legal assistance to aid them in filing lawsuits);
see also Douglas Blaze, Presum~d Frivoloud: Application of Stringent Pleading
Requirements in Civil Rights Litigation, 31 WM. & MARY L. REv. 935, 936-37 (1990);
FifteenthAnnualReview of CriminalProcedure:United States Supreme Court and Courts
ofAppeals 1984-85. W Prisoner'sRights, 74 GEo L.J. 973 (1986) [hereinafter Prisoner's
Rights] (detailing the development of case law establishing prisoners' rights).
38. See, e.g., Blaze, supra note 37; Susan P. Sturm, The Legacy and Future of
Corrections Litigation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1993); Frank J. Murray, Prison
Becomes Launching Padfor Blizzard of Inmate Lawsuits, WASH. TIMES, June20, 1995,
at A3 (describing federal courts as being overrun by prisoners' claims of civil rights
violations).
39. See generally, Prisoner's Rights, supra note 37 (discussing the impact of
litigation on prison reform); Sturm, supra note 38 (same).
40. 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974).
41. Id. (affirming finding of unconstitutionality but remanding for reconsideration
of remedy).
42. Rhiem v. Malcolm, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Subsequently, the case of Benjamin v. Malcolm43 extended the terms of
the Consent Decree to include all of the jails run by New York City."
On occasion inmates used extra-legal means to voice their concerns
about the manner in which jails and prisons were being run.
Dissatisfaction amongst prison populations also resulted in outbreaks of
violence. For example, the lawsuit in Rhem was preceded by an inmate
riot that caused thousands of dollars in property damage.45 However, the
most notorious incident began on September 9, 1971, when the bloodiest
prison riot in American history occurred at the Attica prison in upstate
New York.'
Thirty-nine inmates and correction officers were killed
when the Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, ordered officials
to "retake" the prison.47 The Attica riots were the impetus for numerous
reforms in the operation of jails and prisons. Among them were the
creation of special panels to investigate each death of an individual while
held in the custody of state or local jail officials and the institution of
inmate grievance procedures. 4
2. Expansion of the Powers of the Board of Correction
It was against this backdrop that in the mid-1970s, the BOC urged the
Charter Revision Committee to expand its functions and duties.49 In
June, 1975, the Committee held public hearings on the matter. BOC
Chairman Peter Tufo testified in favor of the proposed changes.' The
proposed revisions, which were put before the voters of New York City
in November of that year, were approved and became effective January
1, 1977.51 The revisions reinforced the BOC's basic structure and
dramatically altered its responsibilities and powers.
43. 564 F. Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 803 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1986).

44. Id.
45. Rhem v. McGrath, 326 F. Supp. 681 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
46. See, e.g., Fred Ferretti, Convicts Revolt at Attica, Hold 32 Guards Hostage,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1971, at Al (reporting the outbreak of the riot); Andrew L.
Yarrow, Savage '71 Attica Riot Recalled as Jurors Prepareto Decide Suit Filed 17
Years Ago, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1992, at B7 (recalling the Attica riot and describing the
retaking of the prison by guards as "an orgy of brutality").
47. See Yarrow, supra note 46.
48. See, e.g., Fred Ferretti, Congressional Committee Also Plans Investigation,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1971, at Al (describing investigations following the Attica riot).
49. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, ANN. REP. 1 (1975-1976).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 1-2.
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The BOC's mandate, which has remained unchanged since the late
1970s, can be found in Chapter 25 of the New York City Charter, entitled
"Department of Correction."' 52
Subsection 626(a) of that Chapter
outlines the basic structure of the BOC, the implications of which will be
considered in this article's later discussion of the structure of the
independent agency to monitor the Police Department's anti-corruption
measures. Under that subsection:
There shall be a city board of correction to consist of nine
members. Members shall be appointed for a term of six years.
Vacancies shall be filled for the remainder of the unexpired term.
Three members shall be appointed by the mayor, three by the
council, and three by the mayor on the nomination jointly by the
presiding justices of the appellate division of the supreme court
for the first and second judicial departments. Appointments shall
be made by the three respective appointing authorities on a
rotating basis to fill any vacancy occurring on or after the
effective date of this charter. Members of the Board may be
reimbursed for expenses incurred in the performance of their
duties. The chairman of the board shall be designated from time
to time by the mayor from among its members. Members of the
board may be removed by the mayor for cause and after a hearing
at which they shall be entitled to representation by counsel.53
In addition to being directed to establish procedures to govern its
affairs, the BOC was empowered to hire a staff to help it carry out its new
duties under the Charter.'
The BOC was further directed to submit
annual reports to its appointing authorities' and, most importantly, to:
establish minimum standards for the care, custody, correction,
treatment, supervision, and discipline of all persons held or
confined under the jurisdiction of the department; ... promulgate
such minimum standards in rules and regulations after giving the
mayor and commissioner an opportunity to review and comment
on the proposed standards, or amendments or additions to such
standards[; and to] establish procedures for the hearing of
grievances, complaints and requests for assistance (1) by or on
52. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 25, §§ 621-27 (1992).

53. Id. § 626(a).
54. Id. § 626(b).
55. Id. § 626(d).
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behalf of any person held or confined under the jurisdiction
of the
56
department or (2) by any employee of the department.
The BOC was also given the power and the duty to inspect and visit
all Department facilities without interference by Department officials, to
evaluate the Department's performance, and to submit reports pertaining
to the Department's program planning and interactions with other law
enforcement entities. 7
Finally, the BOC was given the power "within the scope of its
authority" to:
compel the attendance of witnesses, require the production of
books, accounts, papers and other evidence, administer oaths,
examine persons, and conduct public or private hearings, studies
and investigations ...[and to] institute proceedings in a court of
appropriate jurisdiction to enforce its subpoena power and other
authority pursuant to this section. 8
With the increase in power came an increase in the size of the BOC's
staff, though the number has never reached the level needed in order to
fulfill the BOC's mandate.59 Armed with its more extensive powers and
larger staff, the BOC undertook to fulfill its Charter mandate by drafting
a set of sixteen Minimum Standards to apply to the City's jails.' The
Standards, which cover issues such as the provision of visits, recreation,
and the requirement of non-discriminatory treatment of inmates, were
adopted in 1978.61 Nine years later, the BOC adopted its Mental Health
Minimum Standards, which had the effect of reducing the number of
suicides by inmates.' In 1989, the BOC expanded its oversight of the
delivery of health care to inmates with the promulgation of its Health Care
Minimum Standards.'
As the BOC created these standards, which have the force and effect
of local law, it also prepared reports on specific problems within the jails,
56. Id. § 626(e), (f).
57. Id. § 626(c).
58. Id. § 626(g).
59. See, e.g., This Board Needs Correcting, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1987, at A26
(faulting the BOC for not pushing for the funds to expand its staff in order to fulfill its
mandate).
60. See 40 RuLEs CT. N.Y., §§ 1-01 to 1-16 (1991).
61. Id.
62. See id.§§ 2-01 to 2-09.
63. See id.§§ 3-01 to 3-15.
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both at individual facilities and system-wide.'
Using the work of its
field staff (individuals assigned to specific city jails) and information
gathered from the Department and analyzed by the Board's computer
analyst, the Board was able to monitor such things as the level of violence
in the institutions and the delivery of various services.'
Of particular interest to the BOC was monitoring so called "uses of
force" by correction personnel. The phrase "uses of force" refers to
incidents in which officers are involved in physical altercations with
inmates. There are, of course, many times when use of force is necessary
to maintain order within an institution. At the same time, however, there
are occasions when the force employed can be unnecessay or out of
proportion to what is required to achieve the desired result. In the late
1980s, the BOC's staff regularly gathered information about correction
officers who were frequently involved in violent incidents with inmates.67
The hope was that by monitoring the activities of such individuals and
reporting the results to the Department, officials would know that they had
a potential problem on their hands and would take steps to ameliorate that
problem.'
Correction officials came to see this practice as a useful tool in
helping them identify officers who were perhaps too quick to use violence
and as a way to note what types of situations led to the employment of
violence. The Department created its own software to monitor so-called
"uses of force" and issued a directive requiring review of the records of
officers who were involved in a set number of violent incidents.' If the
review indicated that an officer's actions were unjustified, the officer was
to be sent for counseling and/or disciplined, whichever response seemed
more appropriate under the circumstances.7'

III. SOME PROBLEMS WITH OVERSIGHT
The concept of having an independent agency oversee all or certain
parts of the operations of another agency is a reasonable one, and can
64. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, ANN. RE'. 13-15 (1990) (describing
the BOC's development of management information systems).
65. Id. at 14-15.
66. See, e.g., Selwyn Raab, Jail Official ProposesNew DisciplinaryRules, N.Y.
TIMES, May 5, 1991, at 43 (discussing accusations of brutality against Correction officers
and new disciplinary rules instigated by the Department of Correction).
67. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, ANN. REP. 14 (1990).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 14-15.
70. Id.
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work if the parties involved understand and respect the boundaries of their
respective duties. However, there are a number of problems that can arise
in this context. The most obvious problem is that few people, if any, enjoy
the process of being "overseen," as it carries with it the implicit
assumption that the person or entity under scrutiny is prone to either
dishonesty or incompetence. That only a minority of agencies are ever
subjected to this type of outside scrutiny may further fuel the sense on the
part of some in the monitored agency of being "put upon." When the
agency subjected to oversight is a para-military organization, such as the
Department of Correction, a whole host of other issues arise.71
Certainly, the BOC in its dealings with the Department of Correction has
faced a number of them.
The major areas of conflict between the BOC and the Department in
the past have fallen under the following general headings: (1) conflicts
between the BOC and the interests of the civilian management of the
Department; (2) conflicts between the BOC and the interests of uniformed
personnel within the Department; and (3) conflicts that have arisen when
City officials (e.g. budget officials) have been forced to choose between
the interests of one City agency-the BOC-and another City agency-the
Department of Correction.
A. The Board and Civilian Management
The Commissioner of the Department of Correction is charged with
the responsibility of making decisions about the operations of the
Department.' He or she picks the personnel who have the best chance
of aiding in this process. If matters proceed well, the Commissioner gets
the credit. If things go poorly, the Commissioner is blamed. So, the
ultimate responsibility for the fate of the Department, in any given era,
lies with the Commissioner and the other managers of the Department.
There is no wonder, then, that outside intervention by a body that does not
have the responsibility for operating the system, and will not be blamed
should matters go wrong, is likely to create a sense of frustration.
This sense of frustration has been a significant source of conflict
between the BOC and the Department. The BOC, in carrying out its
official mandate and its duty to be the "eyes" of the public, has often been
placed in the position of being openly critical of the management of the
Department, in both its written reports to the Mayor and City Council,"
71. See infra PART lI.B. and accompanying text.
72. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch. 25, § 623 (1992).
73. See, e.g., N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, A STUDY OF VIOLENCE AND
ITS CAUSES AT THE N.Y. ADOLESCENT RECEPTION AND DETENTION CENTER (Mar.,

1986).
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and in its statements to the media.7' This criticism, while necessary,
made the task of oversight more difficult, as the Board was required to

work closely with and rely upon the efforts of the very individuals of
whom they had been critical.

One of the more well-publicized examples of this phenomenon
occurred during the short-lived tenure of Allyn Sielaff as Commissioner

of the Department of Correction. In the summer of 1990, during the
course of a bitter labor dispute with the management of the Department

of Correction, a group of correction officers blocked the bridge that was

the point of entry to the City's jail complex on Bikers Island.7 5 Their
actions disrupted vital services, such as the delivery of food and medical

care to prisoners on the island, and delayed court proceedings. 76
The crisis on the island seemed about to reach a breaking point when

the officers decided to go back to work.'

Rumors circulated that

correction officers, a number of whom had been drinking, upon returning
to work had plans to exact reprisals on inmates for causing disturbances

during the pendency of the labor dispute. Inmates in the Otis Bantum
Correctional Center (hereinafter OBCC) erected barricades and a riot
74. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, Robert KasanofIs Dead at 62; Lawyer Led
Board of Correction, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 2, 1991, at D10 (noting Kasanof was
consistently critical of prison conditions and the Department of Correction's management,
urging the enforcement of standards, less crowded conditions in prisons, and meaningful
procedures to review charges of misconduct against correction officers); Selwyn Raab,
Jails Commissioner Unveils A New Planfor Riot Prevention, N.Y. TIMES, June 13,
1991, at B5 (describing the BOC's criticism of the Department's handling of a prison
riot, and the Department's new security measures); Craig Wolff, Angry PanelMay Seek
Limit on Jail Inmates, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 1991, § 1, at 25 (describing the BOC's
criticism of the Department of Correction in the context of the Rikers Island
disturbances, and calling for observance of the BOC's Minimum Standards).
75. See also N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECrION, ANN. REP. 22-25 (1991); N.Y.,

N.Y.,

DEP'T OF INVESTIGATIONS, REP. TO THE MAYOR: TmE DISTURBANCE AT THE

RIKERS ISLAND OTIS BANTUM CORRECTIONAL CENTER AUG. 14, 1990: ITS CAUSES AND
THE DEP'T OF CORRECTION RESPONSE (Apr., 1991) [hereinafter DOI REPORT]; see also
Richard Levine, Critics Say Dinkins Miscalculated Guards' Anger, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
16, 1990, at B2 (criticizing the Department of Correction and Commissioner Sielaff for
the handling of the Rikers riot following correction officers' labor dispute and
demonstration); Douglas Martin, Brooklyn Jail Guards Walk Out in Protest of
DisciplinaryAction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1987, at Bi (describing demonstration staged
by Rikers Island guards in protest of disciplinary action against other guards, and of
general working conditions including severe overcrowding).
76. See DOI REPORT, supranote 75; see alsoMartin Gottlieb, BehindRikersMelee:
Tensions Wrought by Strain of Change, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1990, at Bi.
77. DOI REPORT, supra note 75.
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ensued that resulted in a number of injuries and a great amount of
property damage."
As part of its duty to monitor the operations of the Department,
members of the BOC's staff (and sometimes Board members themselves)
go to the scene of inmate disturbances." According l, members of the
BOC staff were present during the riot in OBCC.
One BOC staff
member made a videotape of the lower corridor at OBCC "where bloodstained walls and discarded clothing were evident," 81 suggesting that
some of the inmates were beaten after having been subdued. There were
other indications that force had been used against inmates who had not
participated in the riot, and that excessive use of force had been employed
in other situations. ' Robert Kasanof, the BOC Chairman at the time,
was extremely critical of the way the Department handled the labor
dispute and the aftermath of the riot. Kasanof called for an investigation
of the events surrounding the riot at OBCC and pledged the BOC's
support in seeing to it that any wrongdoers were appropriately
punished.1 The BOC's strenuous-and entirely warranted-criticism of
the Department's response to the situation at OBCC impaired the working
relationship between the two agencies from the higher echelons on down.
Strained relations between the two agencies did not disappear until after
the subsequent resignation of Allyn Sielaff and the appointment of a new
Commissioner."
B. The Board and Uniformed Personnel
As noted, providing oversight of a para-military organization presents
its own unique problems.
The much remarked upon-and
understandable-tendency of law enforcement personnel to see themselves
as a breed apart-from suspects, inmates, civilian management, indeed,
78. See DOI REPORT, supra note 75, at 30-37; see also James Barron, After

Uprisingat Rikers, GuardsAre Said to Have Beaten Inmates, N.Y. TAIB5, Aug. 16,
1990, at Al (discussing allegations of officer brutality and resulting physical injuries
following resolution of correction officers' labor dispute); Kevin Sack, Panel Affirms
Claims ofBeatings at Rikers Island, N.Y. TMIEs, Aug. 30, 1990, at Al (criticizing City
officials in connection with excessive use of force by guards at the OBCC uprising).
79. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECTION, ANN. REP. 22 (1991).
80. Id.
81. Id. at23.
82. Id. at 23.
83. Id. The results of the investigation are contained in the DOI REPORT, supra
note 75.
84. See Selwyn Raab, Reform Plans By JailChief Go Unfidfilled, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
25, 1991, at 33 (describing the downfall and resignation of Commissioner Sielafo.
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from any outside entity -naturally applies to members of the New York
Correction Department.
This mentality, typically-or
stereotypically-associated with the military style, i.e., group loyalty,
rigidity, suspiciousness, seems a naturally poor fit when paired with a
"watchdog" organization comprised of outsiders who subject the
organization's rules to scrutiny, often argue for flexibility in the
application of rules, and disrupt group cohesion by monitoring the
activities of members of the uniformed force. 6
Correction officers in New York City enter their profession through
the same process as the police-an academy. Even before they enter the
jails on a full time basis, they develop shared expectations about the nature
of the enterprise in which they will be engaged. They learn where
correction officers stand in relation to inmates and civilian management.
It is perhaps at this point that the feeling of "them v. us" begins to take
hold. This attitude is further cemented by what the officers find when
they actually begin to work in the institutions. The experience of working
in the jails bonds officers together into something of a brotherhood,
excluding all who are unfamiliar with the world that they know. Because
that world, generally hidden from the rest of the citizenry, involves heavy
doses of violence and despair, correction officers tend to see the "noninitiate" as hopelessly naive about the possibilities for change and different
approaches to solving problems. It is, therefore, quite easy to see how the
demands of an outside oversight agency might seem particularly grating
to individuals who are on the "front line" of a very difficult operation.
While correction managers, perhaps, have their egos on the line when
being second guessed, correction officers faced with the dangers inherent
in law enforcement, may feel that their physical safety is on the line as
well.
Because of skepticism about the merits of oversight, it took officers
some years before they realized that the BOC's Minimum Standards and
oversight actually tended to improve the safety of officers in a number of
ways. The BOC set standards for the number of inmates that could be
housed in a certain area, decreasing the inmate to officer ratio.' The
BOC also issued reports showing deficiencies in the number of uniformed
personnel assigned to certain areas and saved the Department from some
85. See generally MOLLEN COMM'N REP., supra note 4, at 51-69 (discussing police
department culture and the problems it can create).
86. See N.Y., N.Y., BOARD OF CORRECrION, ANN. REP. 23-25 (1991) (describing
tensions between the BOC and the Department of Correction).
87. 40 RULES CT. N.Y., § 1-05 (1991).
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budget cuts that would have further imperiled the safety of officers as well
as inmates."
Despite the general understanding of how the BOC's Minimum
Standards improved the quality of life in the City's jails, and
concomitantly, the quality of job experience of correction officers, points
of conflict between uniformed personnel and the BOC persisted. At times,
uniformed personnel saw the culture of the management of the Department
as being more in line with that of the BOC's. When problems arose, the
three separate groups often became part of shifting alliances, depending
upon the issue at hand. For example, when the BOC staff determined that
there were problems with a particular officer or warden of a jail, the BOC
would often find itself allied with Department management, which may
also have had doubts or concerns about the individual's capabilities.
Conversely, the BOC and uniformed personnel, with the common interest
in providing better security by maintaining an, "officer rich" staffing
pattern, would find themselves as comrades against Department managers
eager to show City Hall that, through their efforts, the Department could
get by with fewer officers.
Ultimately, even if some members of the uniformed force took a dim
view of the BOC's scrutiny of the Department, the general attitude seemed
to be one of cautious neutrality: officers remained generally wary of the
BOC but were willing to give staff members the benefit of the doubt.
This attitude prevailed because the BOC understood the delicate nature of
its enterprise and has exercised its power in a judicious fashion. For the
most part, even if annoyed by oversight, the majority of the men and
women in the uniformed staff of the Department of Correction have come
to view the BOC as just one more agency with a job to do. And if that
job is done fairly, the two groups can work together. Even the most
suspicious individuals can be brought around when they are appealed to
on the basis of fairness and are treated with fairness. It is imperative that
any entity that undertakes to monitor the police department adopt a similar
approach.
C. City Hall: For the Board or For the Department?

One of the major questions raised about having one agency oversee
the operations of another is whether it is truly possible for the "watchdog"
agency to be independent when it and the agency being overseen are both
creatures of the same government, indeed, even the same branch of
88. See Joint Hearings of the Council of the City of New York, May 20, 1994
(testimony of Richard T. Wolf, Executive Director, New York City Board of Correction)
(noting the correlation between increased overtime for correction officers and the
increase in violence at City jails).
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government. Both the BOC and the Department of Correction are City
agencies. They receive their money from the same source. Both must deal
with the same budget officers and bureaucrats. Of course, this problem
exists whenever any government agency is monitored by another.
However, the conflicts that can arise seem particularly problematic in the
much more "hands on" world of city government. The head of the
executive branch of a city-a mayor or city manager-typically takes a
very active approach to city budget matters and has both the ability and
incentive to resort to the court of public opinion when involved in a
politically charged dispute. What happens when there is a conflict
between the goals of the operating agency and the oversight agency? Who
decides which view prevails?
The tri-partite system of appointing the nine members of the BOCthree by the Mayor, three by the City Council, three by the presiding
justices of the First and Second Departments 8 -was, of course, adopted
to achieve the benefits of the principle of separation of powers that exists
in the federal system. Although the concept of separation of powers does
not have the same meaning in the context of local governments, the basic
idea is the same. In theory and in practice, if the BOC hits upon an issue
that the Mayor, for whatever reason, is unlikely to care about (or cares
too much about) representatives from the other branches of government
will be able to make their viewpoints known. This creates a balance that
would be utterly lacking if the Mayor was the sole appointing authority.
This method of appointment has been extremely helpful to the
operation of the BOC, and would be to any "watchdog" agency.
Oversight agencies, by their very nature, are smaller and have fewer
resources than the agencies they oversee. In the case of the BOC, a tiny
agency with a minuscule budget has been directed to monitor a large entity
in which the City has hundreds of millions of dollars invested.' From
an economic standpoint alone, the interests of the Department of
Correction loom larger than those of the BOC.
This situation is exacerbated by the fact that the Mayor appoints the
Commissioner of the Department91 and must work closely with that
individual. While the Mayor does appoint three members of the BOC and
designates the Chairperson, it is easy to see why the Mayor might be more
interested in the "success" of the operating agency-the Department of
Correction-than in the "success" of the oversight agency. Moreover, the
89. N.Y. Crry CHARTER ch. 25, § 626(a) (1992).
90. See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Rikers Is Tense As CutsLoom, and Official Warns
of Crisis, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 17, 1994, at B1 (quoting City Council Speaker Peter F.
Vallone as calling the BOC's one million dollar budget "ridiculously small" in
comparison to the Department of Correction's 765 million dollar budget).
91. See N.Y. CrrY CHARTER ch.1, § 6(a) (1992).

NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVEW

[Vol. 40

BOC's efforts to root out inefficiency and corruption within the
Department would tend not to endear the agency to the Mayor's office.
Part of the day-to-day operations of any monitoring agency, and this
is certainly true of the BOC, is to go places where people do not want
agency representatives to go; to ask questions that others do not want
asked. Many times, these activities lead to the discovery of circumstances
or decisions that reflect badly upon the management of the Department of
Correction.
The BOC has often been faced with the task of telling a Mayor that
there were serious problems with the civilian leadership of the
Department. In addition, the BOC has sometimes been forced to go
public with these problems. These situations have embarrassed mayors,
and made the BOC seem like an enemy of whichever administration was
in power, when, in fact, it was merely carrying out its mandate under the
Charter. No mayor would be pleased with this circumstance. There is,
no doubt, a certain amount of pride that goes with having made a
particular appointment after what is usually a very long and public search
for the right candidate.'
When the chosen candidate fails in some
regard, the Mayor is seen as having failed as well. Therefore, criticism
of the head of an agency can be taken as criticism of the Mayor. ' It is
also likely that the Mayor might, out of a duty of loyalty, continue to
support an appointee long after that appointee's deficiencies become
apparent. In sum, for a variety of reasons, an oversight agency's activities
always have the potential for putting it at odds with the executive branch
of government.
In the situations described above, a monitoring agency comprised only
of mayoral appointees might feel hesitant to criticize a fellow mayoral
appointee because of their common interest in the source of their
authority. While not consistent with the mandate of providing effective
independent oversight, it would be an entirely human reaction. The
BOC's tri-partite appointing mechanism has made it easier for the agency
to fulfill its mandate by blunting the effect of what might be a normal
hesitancy on the part of mayoral appointees to ferret out and reveal
problems that could reflect badly upon the Mayor's office.

92. See, e.g., Selwyn Raab, Dinkins NarrowsJails PostList,N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19,
1992, at B3 (discussing Mayor Dinkins's efforts to replace Department of Correction
Commissioner Sielaff.
93. See, e.g., Maria Newman, Detailing Price of Cuts, Cortines ProposesLarger
Class Sizes, N.Y.TIMES, July 14, 1995, at BI (discussing criticism received by both
Chancellor Ramon C. Cortines and Mayor Giuliani for Cortines's proposed budget cuts
and classroom size increases in New York City schools).
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IV. OVERSIGHT OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURES
WITHIN THE POLICE DEPARTMENT

As noted, the current battle between the Mayor and the City Council
is over the most appropriate method of making appointments to the
independent police monitor and, more importantly, the appropriate scope
of investigative powers to be given to the agency.' Both the leaders of
the Council and the Mayor stress the need to insure the existence of a
strong measure of independence on the part of the outside monitor, and
each thinks its own version meets the standard.9' However, the sharp
difference in the structures of the respective monitoring agencies suggests
that both cannot be right in their assessments of the merits of their
proposals.
A. The City Council's Independent Monitor: Its Level of
Independence and Its Investigative Powers
The City Council's method of appointing members to its "Independent
Police Investigation and Audit Board" mirrors, to a great degree, the
method of appointing members to the BOC. The City Council's proposal
states:
There shall be an independent police investigation and audit
board, which shall consist of five members of the public who
shall be residents of the city of New York. The members of the
board shall be appointed as follows: (i) two members shall be
appointed by the mayor; (ii) two members shall be appointed by
the city council; and (iii) the chair of the board shall be jointly
agpointed by the mayor and the speaker of the city council...
The Council's version of the independent monitor accepts the notion
that independence from the operating agency, in this case the Police
Department, can best be achieved by having dual appointing authorities.
This re-creation of a modified version of the separation of powers concept
shows a recognition of the problems inherent in concentrating too much
94. See Hicks, supra note 8.
95. Id.
96. N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 § 2 (Jan. 19, 1995). Local Law 13 was declared
invalid as a usurpation of the Mayor's executive powers. See Mayor of New York, 1995
WL 478872.
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power in the hands of the executive branch of government. 7 Under the
Council's plan, the Mayor and the Council are placed on equal footing
with respect to appointing members to the Independent Police Investigation
and Audit Board. It is important to note, however, that the Mayor still
will likely have more input into matters, because the Mayor alone chooses
the Police Commissioner.
As to the monitor's investigative powers, the Council's proposal sets
out in great detail the extent and purpose of the monitor's subpoena
power, as well as the relationship between the subpoena power and the
activities of other law enforcement agencies. The Council's independent
monitor is given the express power to conduct its own investigations:
The board, by majority vote of its members, may compel the
attendance of witnesses and require the production of such
records and other materials as are necessary for the investigation
of any matter within its jurisdiction pursuant to this chapter.9"
However, it is also clear that the monitor's investigative powers are not
to interfere with the Police Department's power to conduct its own
investigations. The law states:
The provisions of this chapter shall not be construed to limit or
impair the authority of the police commissioner to investigate
corruption within the department, or to discipline members of the
department. Nor shall the provisions of this chapter be construed
to prevent or hinder the investigation or prosecution of members
of the department for violations of law or rules and regulations of
the department by any court of competent jurisdiction, a grand
jury, district attorney, or other authorized officer, agency, or

body?9

97. While the separation of powers doctrine does not traditionally apply to city
governments, see Kevin R. Cole, Civil Rights: A Call ForQualified Legislative Immunity
for City Council Members Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 66 WASH L. REV. 169, 181
(1991), New York courts have recognized that a modified version of the separation of
powers doctrine applies to the government of New York City, which is based on co-equal
branches of government. See supra note 21; see also Sydney H. Schanberg, Giuliani is
a Take Charge (ofEverything) Guy, N.Y. NEWSDAY, June 20, 1995, at A27 (stating that
the "City Council is one of the checks and balances on the mayor's power" and that the
Mayor, by creating a monitor of police corruption "handpicked by him and beholden to
him[,]" attempts to place too much power in the executive branch of City government).
98. N.Y., N.Y., Local Law 13 (Jan. 19, 1995).
99. Id.
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In this regard, the Council's grant of power is far more explicit than that
of the BOC. The BOC's grant of subpoena power is broad,"° but has
remained largely undefined and untested. The BOC has used the power
sparingly over the years and never for the type of major investigations in
which the independent monitoring agency for the Police Department might
become involved.
Of course, that the City Council's bill says that the Independent Police
Investigation and Audit Board is not to interfere with the Police
Department's or other law enforcement offices' investigative activities,
does not settle the issue. Non-interference may well be the intention. It
is possible, that in its present incarnation the City Council's monitor does
not provide adequate safeguards to prevent investigators from various
agencies-the Police Department, Department of Investigation, the District
Attorneys' offices-from falling over one another, ruining investigations
and, perhaps, jeopardizing lives."0 '
Although this is obviously a serious concern, it does not follow that
the monitor should be denied the unqualified power to act as a true
investigative body. The answer to this problem lies in developing stricter
protocols between agencies regarding investigations. If the City is serious
about attacldng corruption in the Police Department, and having a really
independent and effective monitoring agency aid in this process, the
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board-or whatever it is finally
called-should have the power to issue subpoenas in furtherance of the
goal of fighting corruption.
B. The Mayor's Police Commission
In February, 1995, after having vetoed the Council's bill creating the
Independent Police Investigation and Audit Board and having seen that
veto overridden, the Mayor, by way of Executive Order, created an entity
called the Police Commission." ° That order provides in part:
There hereby is established a Police Commission (the
"Commission") which shall consist of five members appointedby
the Mayor, who shall be residents of the City of New York or
shall maintain a place of business in the City of New York. Each
100. N.Y. CITY CHARTER cli. 25, § 626(g) (1992) (granting the BOC authority to
compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of various documents during the
course of any investigation within its jurisdiction).
101. In fact, the court in Mayor of New York found that the City Council's proposal
did not adequately address the problem of interference with other law enforcement
agencies. See Mayor of New York, 1995 WL 478872.
102. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18 (Feb. 28, 1995).
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The

Commission shall include among its members persons having law

enforcement

experience.

The Mayor shall appoint the

Chairperson from among its members."m

The Mayor opted for placing the power to appoint the Commission
solely in the hands of the executive branch because, in his view, the dual
appointing authority was both unnecessary and violative of the City
Charter. 4 A dual appointing authority was unnecessary because,
"[t]here is nothing to suggest that the Police Department be independent
of the mayor of the City of New York."" 5 The Mayor and the
Corporation Counsel advanced the argument that the dual appointing

authority violated the City Charter because the City Council could not
make appointments "to a board which will oversee the operations of the

executive branch" as this would "intrude into the operation of the
executive branch.""6

On the question of the Commission's investigatory power, the
Mayor's Executive Order reiterates the Police Department's primary role
in investigating allegations of corruption, and provides that:

the Commission shall not investigate such matters except where
the Commission and the Commissioner of the City Department of

Investigation (the DOI), with the approval of the Mayor,
determine that exceptional circumstances exist in which the
assessment of the Police Department's anti-corruption systems
requires the investigation of an underlying allegation of corruption
made against Police Department personnel." 7

It is important to note that under this system, the decision whether to
go forward with an investigation of corruption is in the hands of a Board
comprised of mayoral appointees and an agency head also appointed by
103. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18, § l(a) (Feb. 28, 1995) (emphasis added).
104. See Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiff Mayor's Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant Council's Motion for Summary
Judgment at 2, 7-30, Mayor of New York v. Council of New York, No. 402354, 1995
WL 478872 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 30, 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-3710 (1st Dep't
N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 16, 1995); see also Anthony M. DeStefano, Council's Big Guns;
Potential Cop Watchdogs Eyed, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Feb. 3, 1995, at A31 (discussing the
disagreement between the Mayor and the City Council over the method of appointing
members to the proposed police monitoring agencies).
105. DeStefano, supra note 104.
106. See Hicks, supra note 8 (quoting Mayor Giuliani).
107. N.Y., N.Y., Exec. Order 18, § (3)(b) (Feb. 28, 1995).
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the Mayor. Even more significantly, these two entities can only proceed
with an investigation of corruption following mayoral approval. The
Mayor's power in these circumstances is, in effect, "cubed", leaving no
opportunity for outside input into the decision whether to pursue a claim
of police corruption.
In addition, as pointed out in the discussion of some of the problems
faced by the BOC in carrying out its oversight function, when the Mayor
appoints the head of a "watchdog" agency and the head of the agency
overseen, a question of dual loyalty automatically arises. The problem is
further compounded by the fact that this conflicted loyalty arises in the
context of a much smaller and weaker agency's criticizing and/or
attempting to reform the activities of a larger agency performing an
immediately critical function to the City. Under these circumstances, the
Mayor will be put in the position of choosing to cause turmoil in the latter
agency in favor of supporting the efforts of the former. In sum, the
Mayor will be confronted with the demands of three of his own
appointees-the larger and more powerful Police Department and
Department of Investigation and the much smaller and, likely to be
perceived, "less vital" Police Commission.
Although this vision of the oversight function may serve to boost the
morale of the Police Department (by assuring that "outsiders" have no
influence), it is unlikely to accomplish the goal for which the concept of
oversight was created, i.e. to have an entity without a direct political stake
in a given operating agency review that agency's performance in important
areas. The executive of any city, always has a great stake in the City's
police department, as that executive's fortunes can rise or fall with the
public's perception of the effectiveness of the City's police force." 8
One might argue that the benefits flowing from public sentiment might
create an incentive for mayors to be more diligent in rooting out
corruption. By doing so they could establish reputations as strong fighters
of corruption that would stand them in good stead for future political aims.
Nevertheless, some of the realities of life-the axiom that "no news is
good news" and that no one stays in power forever-makes it more likely
that incidents of corruption during a given mayor's tenure-if left entirely
108. See Rich Connell, RiordanRates Favorably With 45% of Citizens, L.A.TMs,
Nov. 7, 1993, at Al (stating that the rise in popularity of Los Angeles Mayor Richard
Riordan correlated with the rise in approval ratings of the Los Angeles Police
Department); J.Michael Kennedy, Flynn Takes a Fallfrom Political Peak to Valley,
L.A. TIams, Jan. 29, 1992, at AS (stating that the decline in popularity of Boston Mayor
Raymond Flynn was due in part to problems with the Police Department).
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up to the mayor-may not be pursued with too much diligence. 11
Intermittent investigations of corruption may enhance the sense that a
mayor has a commitment to rooting out the "bad apples" within the Police
Department. A steady stream of such investigations would invariably be
to the detriment of the person who sits behind the desk where the "buck
stops." As no sane individual will voluntarily preside over his or her own

demise, it is unlikely that the will to root out corruption will trump the
will to be well thought of by the public.
V.

CONCLUSION

It seems, then, that the best way to insure effective oversight is to
provide for the greatest amount of independence possible for the
monitoring agency. In addition, the system should be set up so as to
minimize the need to rely upon human perfection. For example, because
we know that problems can arise from too much centralization of power,
the oversight regime should be structured to prevent that concentration,
rather than relying on the good sense or good faith efforts of a chief
executive to avoid those problems.
The oversight body must be responsible to some outside authority in
government, but that outside authority does not have to be one entity.
This is particularly important when considering oversight of certain
aspects of an agency like the Police Department. There has been, in many
neighborhoods in New York City, a substantial erosion of public faith in
the police. The creation of an agency that seems too deferential to the
prerogatives of the police may not be worth the effort, as it is unlikely to
inspire public confidence and may, in fact, make matters worse.
The decentralization of the appointing authority, which has worked
well in the context of the BOC, should be maintained in some
form-regardless of which version of the independent police monitor is
adopted. The police monitoring agency must be composed of individuals
who are capable of exercising autonomous judgment. Steps should be
taken, either through compromise between the Mayor and the City
Council, or through a public referendum, to enact a truly independent
police monitor.
At the very least, if the Mayor retains the power to appoint all
members to the monitoring agency, there should be limits on the number
of times an individual can serve as an independent monitor. This would
free the members to make decisions based on their conscience and
109. See Schanberg, supra note 8 (stating that "all mayors want to control and
contain scandal on their watches" in order to maintain a "wall of positive information"
around them).
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diminish the potential for pandering to aims of one individual who
occupies a certain office.
As a policy matter, the City Council's grant of strong subpoena
powers to the proposed independent monitor should also be maintained,
as it is the best way to insure that the entity will be taken seriously by
those whose activities it may be forced to investigate. There should be no
ambiguity about the independent police monitor's power in this regard,
particularly since that power is for the limited though important purpose
of monitoring the Police Department's anti-corruption efforts.
In sum, the goal of providing oversight is a worthy one. That
monitoring agencies are not panaceas does not dispel this fact. There are
no panaceas, but there are problems to be resolved that require a great
amount of creativity, effort and, in fact, a little faith. There is no good
reason why the city of New York cannot have an effective outside
mechanism for minimizing the level of corruption in its Police
Department. The Mollen Commission's suggestions of how to do this
provide a good start.

